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In a standard general equilibrium model it is assumed that there are no price restrictions
and that prices adjust in¯nitely fast to their equilibrium values. In case of price restrictions
a general equilibrium may not exist and rationing on net demands or supplies is needed to
clear the markets. In the mid 1970s it was shown that in case of upper and lower bound
restrictions on the prices there exists a quantity constrained equilibrium at which not both
demand and supply of a good are rationed simultaneously and there is rationing on the
net supply or net demand of a good only if the price of that good is on its lower or upper
bound, respectively.
For an arbitrary set of admissible prices it was recently proposed to let the rationing
schemes be determined by the components of a vector being a direction in which the prices
are restricted to move. When the set of restricted prices is convex and compact, it was
shown that there exists a connected set of such quantity constrained equilibria, containing
two trivial no-trade equilibria without trade opportunities. In this paper we re¯ne the
concept of quantity constrained equilibrium and propose a speci¯c quantity constrained
equilibrium which may serve as a general equilibrium in case of price restrictions. At this
equilibrium demand rationing and supply rationing are in balance with each other, so that
trade opportunities are maximal and therefore trivial no-trade and other equilibria with
less trade opportunities are excluded. Moreover, in equilibrium only relative prices matter.
Any homogenous transformation or normalization of the set of admissible prices yields the
same set of quantity constrained general equilibria up to scaling of the price vectors.
Key words: exchange economy, price restrictions, general equilibrium, rationing.
JEL-code: C62, C63, C68, D51.1 Introduction
Perfect competition is a basic assumption in economic theory. Agents are assumed to be
price takers and therefore express their demand and supply at the prevailing prices on the
market. Trade takes place only at a price system for which for every commodity total
demand equals total supply. It is assumed that there is no restriction on the prices and
that prices adjust in¯nitely fast. Walras (1874) considered the problem of the existence of
a general competitive equilibrium, corresponding to a price system at which all markets
clear simultaneously. Under very general conditions the existence of such a Walrasian
equilibrium was shown in the 1950s by Debreu (1959) and others.
Unemployment and excess supply on commodity and factor markets are apparently
serious problems in many countries. Price restrictions and regulations, such as price con-
trols to reduce in°ation, see Cox (1980), Nguyen and Whalley (1986, 1990), and Ginsburgh
and Van der Heyden (1988), price systems resulting from models with imperfect competi-
tion or incomplete markets, see B¶ enassy (1993), Drµ eze (1997) and Herings and Polemar-
chakis (2000), or for instance minimum wages and price indexation, often prevent prices
from adjusting in the right direction, so that prices can not reach their Walrasian equilib-
rium values. Nevertheless also under price regulations trade takes place on the markets.
When trade occurs against disequilibrium prices, markets may clear through rationing
instead of prices, e.g. by imposing quantity rationing, queueing systems or production
quota. In the mid 1970s Drµ eze (1975) and Benassy (1975) independently developed mar-
ket clearing mechanisms for economies with price regulations by using quantity rationing.
In that approach an agent chooses a most preferred consumption bundle, subject to both
a budget constraint and quantity constraints on net demands and supplies. In order to let
the market function frictionless, the quantity rationing may e®ect excess supply or excess
demand, but not both simultaneously. When price rigidities are given by lower and upper
bounds on the prices of the commodities, Drµ eze and Benassy proved the existence of an
equilibrium, at which at least one a priorily chosen commodity is not being rationed at
all, for example the numeraire good or money. Further supply (demand) rationing on a
nonnumeraire commodity can only be binding when its price is on its lower (upper) bound.
In the 1980s both van der Laan and Kurz argued that in practice rationing on net
demand is rarely observed and di±cult to implement. This motivated these authors to
consider Drµ eze equilibria with only rationing on the net supplies. In van der Laan (1980,
1982) and Kurz (1982) the existence of a Drµ eze equilibrium, satisfying that only rationing
on the net supplies occurs and at least one commodity is not rationed at all, has been
proven. Such an equilibrium is called a supply constrained or unemployment equilibrium.
In case the set of admissible prices is a cube determined by lower and upper bounds, it has
been shown in Herings, Talman and Yang (1996) by using a simplicial technique, that there
1exists a connected set of constrained equilibria, containing two trivial no-trade equilibria.
At one of these equilibria all commodities are fully rationed in their supply and all prices
are on their lower bound, whereas at the other trivial equilibrium all commodities are fully
rationed in their demand and all prices are on their upper bound. The set also contains
for every commodity a Drµ eze equilibrium at which that commodity is not being rationed
at all. One of these Dr¶ eze equilibria is a supply constrained equilibrium with no rationing
on the demands, another one is a demand constrained equilibrium with no rationing on
the supplies.
In Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2004) general sets of admissible prices, al-
lowing for an arbitrary compact and convex set of positive prices, are considered. For the
general case it can not be assured that there is only rationing for a commodity if its price
is equal to its (global) minimum or maximum value. In Herings et al. (2004) the rationing
scheme is determined by a direction in which the prices are restricted to move, being a
vector pointing outwards from the set of admissible prices. They show that there exists
a connected set of so-called quantity constrained equilibria (QCEs) containing two trivial
no-trade equilibria, one equilibrium with full rationing on the supplies and the sum of the
prices being minimized, whereas at the other trivial no-trade equilibrium all consumers
are fully rationed on their demands and the sum of the prices is maximized. These two
equilibria do not allow for any trade opportunities for the consumers.
In this paper we propose to re¯ne the quantity constrained equilibrium concept in
case of restricted prices by maximizing the trade opportunities for the agents. We require
that at a quantity constrained equilibrium the potential rationing levels on demands and
supplies should be in balance with each other. For example, there should be no demand
rationing on all markets and also no supply rationing on all markets. This automatically
excludes the trivial no-trade equilibria at which there is one-sided full rationing on all
markets but it also excludes other QCEs with too much demand rationing or too much
supply rationing. We call such an equilibrium a quantity constrained general equilibrium
(QCGE) and show that such an equilibrium always exists if the set of admissible prices is
a nonempty convex and compact set in the interior of the price space.
It is well known that at a Walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy without
price restrictions only relative prices matter. When all prices in a Walrasian equilibrium are
multiplied with a positive constant, the new price vector is also a Walrasian equilibrium
price vector, yielding the same equilibrium allocation. We will show that this property
also holds for a quantity constrained general equilibrium. When all prices in a QCGE
are multiplied with a positive constant and the new price vector is still an element of the
set of admissible prices, the new price vector is also a QCGE price vector for the same
rationing scheme and yielding the same equilibrium allocation. This property does not
2hold for quantity constrained equilibria that are not general equilibria. It also implies that
when prices are normalized the set of quantity constrained general equilibrium allocations
is the same. More general, if the set of admissible prices is transformed in a homogenous
way, the set of quantity constrained general equilibrium allocations does not change. This
also implies that if the set of admissible prices is unbounded or not convex but can be
homogenously transformed to a compact and convex set a quantity constrained general
equilibrium will exist. Also because of this homogeneity property the concept of a quantity
constrained general equilibrium seems to be in case of price restrictions the equilibrium
concept which is closest to a Walrasian equilibrium. In case a Walrasian equilibrium price
vector happens to be an element of the set of admissible prices, then this equilibrium is
also a quantity constrained (general) equilibrium, one at which no (binding) rationing takes
place and therefore having maximal trade opportunities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model of Drµ eze and
introduces the concept of quantity constrained general equilibrium. For the compact,
convex case with positive prices the existence results are given in Section 3. Homogeneity
properties cases are discussed in Section 4, including the unbounded case.
2 The model
We consider an exchange economy E = (fXi;ºi;wigm
i=1;P): In this economy there are
m consumers, indexed i = 1;:::;m, and n commodities, indexed j = 1;:::;n. For k a
positive integer, we denote Ik = f1;:::;kg. Each consumer i 2 Im is characterized by a
consumption set Xi, a preference preordering ºi on Xi; and a vector of initial endowments
wi. The vector w is de¯ned by w =
P
i2Im wi. We assume that the economy E is faced
with a set P ½ I R
n
+ of admissible prices.
The following standard assumptions X, U and W with respect to the economy E are
made.
Assumption X
For every consumer i 2 Im; the consumption set Xi is a closed and convex subset of I R
n
+




For every consumer i 2 Im; the preference preordering ºi on Xi is complete, continuous,
strongly monotonic, and strictly convex.1
1A preference preordering ºi is said to be strongly monotonic if xi; b xi 2 Xi; xi · b xi; and xi 6= b xi
implies b xi Âi xi: A preference preordering ºi is said to be strictly convex when for any pair xi; b xi 2 Xi;
3Assumption W
For every consumer i 2 Im, the vector of initial endowments wi belongs to the interior of Xi.
The assumption of strict convexity allows us to work with demand functions instead of
demand correspondences. Concerning the set of admissible prices we make the following
assumption.
Assumption P




The assumption that the set of admissible prices lies in the interior of I R
n
+ allows
us to stay away from prices equal to zero. The other assumptions are needed to prove
existence, although boundedness is not essential, as we will see later on.
The set P of admissible prices may or may not contain a Walrasian price system




i2Im x¤i = w with
x¤i a best element for ºi in the budget set fxi 2 Xi j p¤ ¢ xi · p¤ ¢ wig of consumer i,
i 2 Im. When not, one may introduce an equilibrium concept involving vectors of quantity
constraints on the net demands and the net supplies of the commodities. Given a price
system p 2 P, a rationing scheme on (net) supply ` 2 ¡I R
n
+, and a rationing scheme on
(net) demand u 2 I R
n




i j p ¢ x
i · p ¢ w




k · ukwk; 8k 2 Ing:
The number `k (uk) is the fraction of the total endowment of commodity k each consumer is
allowed to supply (demand) maximally. The corresponding constrained demand di(p;`;u)
of consumer i is de¯ned as the best element for ºi in Bi(p;`;u). Because of the strict
convexity and strong monotonicity assumptions and since Bi(p;`;u) is not empty and
compact, this element is unique and lies on the budget hyperplane, i.e. p¢di(p;`;u) = p¢wi.
If xi
k ¡ wi
k = `kwk for some i 2 Im and k 2 In, we say that consumer i is constrained or
rationed on his supply, and if xi
k ¡ wi
k = ukwk for some i 2 Im and k 2 In, we say that
consumer i is constrained or rationed on his demand.
In equilibrium we require that prices and rationing schemes are such that aggregate
constrained demand equals aggregate supply, i.e., all markets clear. Moreover, the rationing
schemes should allow for maximal trade opportunities. This means that markets have to
be frictionless in the sense that if some consumer is constrained on his demand (supply)
such that xi 6= b xi; xi »i b xi; holds ¸xi + (1 ¡ ¸)b xi Âi xi for ¸ 2 (0;1).
4of a commodity, no consumer is constrained on his supply (demand) of that commodity.
Moreover, the rationing on demand and the rationing on supply over all markets should
be balanced in the sense that in equilibrium there should be neither too much demand
rationing nor too much supply rationing. For example, if there is full supply rationing
on all markets, there are no trade opportunities at all, because no consumer is allowed to
supply anything. Similarly, in case of full demand rationing on all markets, there are no
trade opportunities either, since no agent is able to demand more than his endowment.
Further, there should be a direct link between the rationing scheme and the price restric-
tion. If there are no restriction on the price, i.e., the price vector lies in the interior of the
set of admissible prices, there should be no rationing at all, neither on the demand sides
nor on the supply sides, because prices are °exible enough to move towards an equilibrium
price. In case the prices are restricted, i.e., the price vector lies on the boundary of the set
of admissible prices, there is some direction in which the prices can not move any further.
In equilibrium, this direction should completely determine the rationing levels in case of ra-
tioning. If a component of this direction is positive only demand rationing might occur on
the corresponding market, and if a component of it is negative only supply rationing might
occur. Moreover, the (absolute) values of the components of the direction in which the
price vector is not able to move should determine in equilibrium how severe the rationing
has to be, the higher the value, the more severe the rationing should be. A direction into
which a restricted price vector p can not move is a vector that points outward at p to the
set of admissible prices. The set of vectors that at a given price vector p point outwards
to the set P of admissible prices is called the subgradient at p to P. Formally, for p 2 P
the subgradient G(p) at p to the set P is given by
G(p) = fr 2 I R
njb p ¢ r · p ¢ r for any b p 2 Pg:
De¯nition 2.1 (Quantity Constrained General Equilibrium)
A Quantity Constrained General Equilibrium QCGE for the economy E = (fXi;ºi,
wigm
i=1; P) is a price system p¤ 2 P, a rationing scheme (`¤;u¤) 2 ¡I R
n
+ £ I R
n
+, and,
for every consumer i 2 Im, a consumption bundle x¤i 2 Xi such that
(i) for all i 2 Im, x¤i = di(p¤;`¤;u¤);
(ii)
Pm
i=1 x¤i = w;
(iii) for all k 2 In: x¤h
k ¡ wh
k = `¤
kwk for some h 2 Im implies x¤i
k ¡ wi
k < u¤









5(iv) there exists r¤ 2 G(p¤) such that p¤ ¢ r¤ = 0 and for all k 2 In it holds that if there










k = 1 ¡ r¤
k.
In this de¯nition, the rationing schemes on supply and demand are assumed to be uniform,
i.e. the same for each consumer. This assumption can be easily relaxed. Condition (i)
requires that the consumption of each consumer equals his constrained demand, i.e., each
consumer is maximizing his utility given the equilibrium prices and rationing scheme.
Condition (ii) is the market clearing condition. Condition (iii) implies that there can be
no simultaneous rationing on both sides of any market, so that all markets are frictionless.
Condition (iv) links the rationing scheme to the price restriction. In case of rationing, the
level of rationing is completely determined by a vector r¤ which is orthogonal to the price
vector and a direction in which the prices can not further move. If r¤
k = 0 for some good
k, no consumer can be rationed on his demand or supply of good k, since in equilibrium
for every consumer i it holds that ¡wk < ¡wi
k · x¤i
k < wk.
In case there is no price restriction at all at the equilibrium price p¤, i.e., p¤ lies in the
(full-dimensional) interior of P, then the subgradient of P at p¤ is just the origin and prices
can move freely in any direction. In this case r¤ = 0n and no rationing will take place. A
QCGE at an unrestricted price vector is therefore a Walrasian equilibrium.
In case there is some price restriction at the equilibrium price p¤, i.e., the price vector p¤
is on the boundary of the set P, the subgradient of P at p¤ contains also nonzero vectors
and therefore r¤ might be a nonzero vector. If r¤ = 0n the equilibrium is again a Walrasian
equilibrium and the equilibrium price vector happens to be on the boundary of the set
of admissible prices. If r¤
k ¸ 0 no supply rationing can occur on market k and if r¤
k · 0
no demand rationing can occur on market k. Since r¤ is a direction in which the prices
can not further move at p¤, demand rationing for a good can only occur if prices can not
be moved in a direction at which the price of that good is increased and supply rationing
for a good can only occur if in that direction the price of that good cannot be decreased.
Moreover, in case of rationing the values of the components of this direction r¤ completely
determine the levels of rationing. A higher positive r¤
k yields more severe demand rationing
since in case of demand rationing on market k it holds that u¤
k = 1 ¡ r¤
k, whereas a more
negative r¤
k yields more severe supply rationing since in case of supply rationing it holds
that l¤
k = ¡1¡r¤
k. In case of demand rationing on market k the component r¤
k lies between
0 and 1 and in case of supply rationing on market k the component r¤
k lies between 0 and
¡1. When r¤
k = 1 there is complete demand rationing on market k and no consumer is
allowed to demand more of commodity k than his initial endowment, and since markets
clear in equilibrium no consumer will supply something of good k either. Similarly, when
r¤
k = ¡1 there is complete supply rationing on market k and no consumer is able to supply
6anything of good k and therefore in equilibrium no consumer can demand something of it
either.
The condition p¤ ¢ r¤ = 0 implies that in equilibrium demand and supply rationing are
in balance with each other. Too much demand rationing or too much supply rationing
restricts the trade opportunities of the consumers. For example, if r¤
k > 0 for all k, there
could be demand rationing on all markets, which limits the trade opportunities for all
consumers. Similarly, if rk < 0 for all k, there might be supply rationing on all markets, so
that the trade opportunities are also limited. In general, these outcomes lead to not very
satisfactory equilibria or even to trivial no-trade equilibria. The condition p¤¢r¤ = 0 means
that either r¤ = 0n, in which case there is no rationing at all and we have a Walrasian
equilibrium without any rationing, or some of the components of r¤ are positive and some
other components of r¤ are negative. Only for the positive components there can be demand
rationing and only for the negative components there can be supply rationing. In this way,
in equilibrium there can be not too much demand rationing or too much supply rationing
on all markets, so that equilibria with too few or no trade opportunities are excluded.
Remark that although a nonzero vector r¤ has both positive and negative components this
does not mean that there will be always both demand and supply rationing. Only demand
rationing or only supply rationing may occur but not simultaneously on all markets.
3 Existence results
To show the existence of a QCGE, we follow Herings et al. (2004) and introduce a full-
dimensional compact and convex set Q ½ I R
n with smooth boundary and containing the set
of admissible prices P in its interior and de¯ne for every q 2 Q a price vector p(q) 2 P, a





The set Q is taken to be set
Q = fq 2 I R
n jk q ¡ p k2· 1 for some p 2 Pg:
For q 2 Q, the admissible price vector p(q) 2 P is de¯ned by the orthogonal projection of
q on P, i.e.,
p(q) = arg min
p2P k p ¡ q k2 :
Since by Assumption P, the set P is convex and compact, for every q 2 Q it holds that
p(q) is uniquely de¯ned and continuous in q and that q ¡ p(q) 2 G(p(q). For q 2 Q, the
vector r(q) 2 I R
n is de¯ned by
r(q) = 0
n when q 2 P
7and, for k 2 In,
rk(q) =
qk ¡ pk(q)
maxh2In jqh ¡ ph(q)j
k q ¡ p(q) k2; when q 2 Q n P:
The function r(¢) is a continuous function on Q and for all q 2 Q it holds that r(q) 2 G(p(q)
and ¡1 · rk(q) · 1 for all k 2 In. Finally, for q 2 Q the rationing scheme (`(q);u(q)) 2
¡I R
n
+ £ I R
n
+ is de¯ned by
`k(q) = ¡1 ¡ rk(q) and uk(q) = 1 ¡ rk(q); k 2 In:
We now de¯ne for any consumer i 2 Im his reduced budget set Bi(q) by
B
i(q) = B
i(p(q);`(q);u(q)); q 2 Q








i; for all y
i 2 B
i(q)g:
From Herings et al. (2004) it follows that di is a continuous function on Q and so is the







The next result shows that if q¤ is a zero point of z satisfying p(q¤) ¢ r(q¤) = 0, then q¤
induces a QQCGE.
Lemma 3.1
Let E = (fXi;ºi, wigm
i=1;P) be an economy satisfying Assumptions X, U, W and P and let
q¤ be a zero point of the corresponding reduced excess demand function z, i.e. z(q¤) = 0n,
satisfying p(q¤) ¢ r(q¤) = 0. Then the price system p¤ = p(q¤), the rationing scheme
(`¤;u¤) = (`(q¤);u(q¤)) 2 ¡I R
n
+ £ I R
n
+ and, for each i 2 Im, the bundle x¤i given by
x¤i = di(q¤), conmstitute a quantity constrained general equilibrium.
Proof.
We have to show that the conditions (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of De¯nition 2.1 hold. By
construction it holds for all i 2 Im that di(q¤) = di(p(q¤);`(q¤);u(q¤)), so that x¤i =





i2Im x¤i ¡ w, also condition (ii) holds. From
P
i2Im x¤i = w it follows for every
i 2 Im that 0n · x¤i · w and therefore from Assumption W that ¡wk < x¤i
k ¡ wi
k < wk,
k 2 In. Moreover, for any k 2 In, it follows that `¤
k · ¡1 when rk(q¤) ¸ 0 and u¤
k ¸ 1 when
rk(q¤) · 0. So, if for some h 2 Im it holds that x¤h
k ¡wh
k = `¤
kwk; we must have `¤
k > ¡1 and
therefore rk(q¤) < 0 and thus u¤
k ¸ 1; and so x¤i
k ¡ wi
k < u¤
kwk for all i 2 Im: Analogously,
8if for some h 2 Im it holds that x¤h
k ¡ wh
k = u¤
kwk; we must have u¤
k < 1 and therefore
rk(q¤) > 0 and thus `¤
k · ¡1; and so x¤i
k ¡ wi
k > `¤
kwk for all i 2 Im: This proves condition
(iii). To prove condition (iv), consider the vector r¤ = r(q¤): Since r(q¤) 2 G(p(q¤)), it





Therefore, condition (iv) is also satis¯ed if p¤ ¢ r¤ = p(q¤) ¢ r(q¤) = 0. Q.E.D.
From Lemma 3.1 it follows that the question of existence of a QCGE reduces to the
existence of a zero point q¤ of z in Q satisfying p(q¤) ¢ r(q¤) = 0. Let Q0 and Q1 be given
by
Q0 = fq 2 Qje ¢ q · e ¢ e q for all e q 2 Qg
and
Q1 = fq 2 Qje ¢ q ¸ e ¢ e q for all e q 2 Qg;
where e 2 I R
n is the vector with all components equal to one. Clearly, since Q is compact,
the sets Q0 and Q1 are both non-empty. Moreover, the intersection of Q0 and Q1 is empty,
since Q is full-dimensional. The existence of a quantity constrained general equilibrium
follows from the next result, shown in Herings et al. (2004), saying that Q contains a
connected set C of zero points of z having a nonempty intersection with both Q0 and Q1.
Lemma 3.2 Let E = (fXi;ºi, wigm
i=1;P) be an economy satisfying Assumptions X, U,
W and P. Then there exists a connected set C of zero points of the corresponding reduced
excess demand function z in Q satisfying C \ Q0 6= ; and C \ Q1 6= ;.
From this lemma the next main result follows.
Theorem 3.3
Let E = (fXi;ºi, wigm
i=1;P) be an economy satisfying Assumptions X, U, W and P, then
a quantity constrained general equilibrium of E exists.
Proof.
From Lemma 3.2 it follows that there exists a connected set C ½ Q of zero points of the
corresponding reduced excess demand function z such that C \ Q0 6= ; and C \ Q1 6= ;.
For q0 2 C \ Q0 it holds that r(q0) = ¡e and therefore p(q0) ¢ r(q0) < 0, whereas for
q1 2 C \ Q1 it holds that r(q1) = e and therefore p(q1) ¢ r(q1) > 0. Since C is a connected
set having a nonempty intersection with both Q0 and Q1 and since both functions p(¢) and
r(¢) are continuous on Q, there exists q¤ 2 C satisfying p(q¤)¢r(q¤) = 0. From Lemma 3.1
it follows that q¤ induces a quantity constrained general equilibrium of E Q.E.D.
94 Properties
In this section we show that a quantity constrained general equilibrium is not sensitive
for a homogenous transformation of the set of admissible prices. We call the set P 0 a
homogenous transformation of the set P if for every p0 2 P 0 there exists a p 2 P satisfying
p = ¸p0 for some ¸ > 0 and for every p 2 P there exists a p0 2 P 0 satisfying p0 = ¹p
for some ¹ > 0. Notice that for a particular point p0 2 P 0 there can be more than one
p 2 P satisfying p = ¸p0 for some ¸ > 0. If P 0 is a homogenous transformation of a set
of admissible prices P and the economy further consists of the same consumers, then in
general the sets of quantity constrained equilibria di®er for both economies. This is caused
by the fact that the subgradients of P at p and of P 0 at p0 may di®er from each other when
p = ¸p0 for some ¸ > 0. However, for quantity constrained general equilibria this is not
the case, since as will be shown in the next theorem any QCGE for the economy with P as
admissible set of prices induces a QCGE with the same rationing schemes and allocation
for the economy with P 0 as the set of admissible prices.
Theorem 4.1
Suppose P 0 is a homogenous transformation of P and let (p¤;(`¤;u¤);(x¤i)m
i=1) be a QCGE
of the economy E = (fXi;ºi, wigm
i=1;P) satisfying Assumptions X, U, W and P. Then
for any p0 2 P 0 satisfying p0 = ¹p¤ for some ¹ > 0, and such a p0 exists, it holds that
(p0;(`¤;u¤);(x¤i)m




i=1) is a QCGE of the economy E = (fXi;ºi, wigm
i=1;P), there exists
r¤ 2 G(p¤) satisfying condition (iv) with respect to this equilibrium. Since r¤ 2 G(p¤) and
p¤ ¢ r¤ = 0, it holds that p ¢ r¤ · 0 for all p 2 P. Now take any p0 2 P 0 satisfying p0 = ¹p¤
for some ¹ > 0. Such a p0 exists because P and P 0 are homogenous transformations
from each other. We now show that (p0;(`¤;u¤);(x¤i)m
i=1) is a QCGE in the economy
E0. Clearly, for every consumer i 2 Im, it holds that B0
i(p0;l¤;u¤) = Bi(p¤;l¤;u¤), where
B0
i(p0;l¤;u¤) is the constrained budget set of consumer i in the economy E0 at price vector




i(p0;`¤;u¤) is the constrained demand of consumer i in the economy E0 at price
vector p0 and rationing scheme (`¤;u¤). Hence, (p0;(`¤;u¤);(x¤i)m
i=1) satis¯es condition
(i) of a QCGE in the economy E0. Since the rationing schemes and allocation are the
same, conditions (ii) and (iii) of a QCGE in the economy E0 are automatically satis¯ed
at (p0;(`¤;u¤);(x¤i)m
i=1). To show that also condition (iv) of a QCGE in the economy E0
is satis¯ed at (p0;(`¤;u¤);(x¤i)m
i=1), we still have to show that r¤ 2 G0(p0) and p0 ¢ r¤ = 0,
where G0(p0) is the subgradient of P 0 at p0. Take any p 2 P 0 and let p00 be any point in
P satisfying p = ¹p00 for some ¹ > 0. From p00 2 P it follows that p00 ¢ r¤ · 0 and from




¤ · 0 = p
0 ¢ r
¤:
Since p is an arbitrary point in P 0, we obtain that r¤ 2 G0(p0), which completes the proof.
Q.E.D.
Notice that it is not assumed that the set P 0 is bounded or convex. From the theorem it
also follows that if p¤ is a QCGE price vector and p in P is a multiple vector of p¤, i.e.,
p = ¸p¤ for some ¸ > 0, then p is also a QCGE price vector with the same rationing scheme
and allocation as for p¤. This is caused by the fact that for the vector r¤ that exists in
condition (iv) with respect to p¤ it holds that p ¢ r¤ = 0 and r¤ 2 G(p), so that condition
(iv) also holds with respect p for the same r¤, rationing scheme and allocation.
Corollary 4.2
Let (p¤;(`¤;u¤);(x¤i)m
i=1) be a QCGE of the economy E = (fXi;ºi, wigm
i=1;P) satisfying
Assumptions X, U, W and P, and let p0 2 P 0 be such that p0 = ¸p¤ for some ¸ > 0. Then
(p0;(`¤;u¤);(x¤i)m
i=1) is also a QCGE of the economy E.
This result is very well known for a Walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy without
restricted prices. When in such an economy all components of a Walrasian equilibrium
price vector are multiplied with the same (positive) constant, the new price vector is also
a Walrasian equilibrium price vector, yielding the same allocation. In this way the set
of prices can be normalized, for example by summing up all prices to some constant or
taking one of the prices equal to one. Theorem 4.1 tells us that such a normalization is
also allowed in case there are price restrictions and we take as equilibrium concept the
quantity constrained general equilibrium. Any normalization that leads to a homogenous
transformation of the set of admissible prices yields the same set of quantity constrained
general equilibria. For example, dividing every component of any admissible price vector
by the sum of the components of that vector leads to a homogenous transformation with
sum of the prices equal to one and yields therefore the same set of equilibrium allocations.
Another example is to divide every component of any admissible price vector by a speci¯c
component of that vector. Then a homogenous transformation of the set of admissible
prices is obtained at which the price of one of the goods is always equal to one. The set
of QCGEs is the same, but the prices are normalized by taking one of the goods as the
numeraire having price equal to one.
Theorem 4.1 implies that for quantity constrained general equilibria only relative prices
matter. When in equilibrium relative prices do not change and prices are still admissible,
then again an equilibrium is obtained for the same rationing scheme and allocation. In this
11way also the existence of a quantity constrained general equilibrium can be analyzed in
case the set of admissible prices is unbounded. For example, if the set of admissible prices
is a convex closed cone in (the interior of) I R
n
+, so that p0 2 P whenever p0 = ¸p for some
¸ > 0 and p 2 P, then there exists a ray of quantity constrained equilibrium price vectors.
Each price vector on this ray corresponds to the same equilibrium rationing scheme and
allocation. The existence of such a ray of equilibrium prices is guaranteed by the fact that
the set P of admissible prices can be homogenously transformed to a convex and compact
set P 0 of prices, e.g., by taking the sum of the prices equal to 1. Every QCGE with respect
to the latter set is also a QCGE with respect to the set P and corresponds to a ray of
QCGEs with respect to the latter set. If the set P of admissible prices is unbounded but
not a convex and closed cone, a quantity constrained general equilibrium is guaranteed
to exist if there exist a homogenous transformation of P which is a compact and convex




Suppose that the Assumptions X, U and W hold for the economy E = (fXi;ºi, wigm
i=1;P)
and suppose also that there exists a a homogenous transformation of P which is a nonempty
compact and convex subset in the interior of I R
n
+. Then there exists a QCGE for the
economy E.
We remark that a homogenous transformation of P, which is a nonempty compact and
convex subset in the interior of I R
n
+, may not exist, even if P is a nonempty closed and
convex set in the interior of I R
n
+. In that case a QCGE may not exist.
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